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Music educationalists are probably agreed upon one thing if nothing else: that theory and 
practice in the field urgently need to embrace diversity. This might encompass the 
diversity of musical styles which the globalisation of the music industry with one hand is 
making widely available, and with the other hand is threatening to swamp; the 
localisation of traditional musics being bolstered by that same industry as well as by 
governments and pressure groups in response to such threats; the appropriation and re-
working of global musical styles in local settings, with and without the ‘help’ of 
commercial interest; the diverse responses to and uses of musics in different places, by 
different ethnic groups, religions, social classes, genders, ‘sub-cultures’, ‘scenes’ and 
other social groups; the rapidly changing array of music technology which is impacting 
on approaches to music-making; or the diversity of musical reception practices and 
approaches to music teaching and learning. How can music education philosophers and 
theorists, let alone practitioners, come to grips with such factors? 
 
At the present time, the Adornian project of discerning within music, traces of the 
structure and ideology of the society from which that music springs, has been largely 
discarded. Sociological interest in music is focussing instead on questions of how musical 
meanings are constructed through discourse, use, education, the media and other social 
practices and institutions, at the levels both of face-to-face interaction and of wider social 
structures (Martin, 1995; Finnegan, 1989; Negus, 1999; DeNora, 2000 and 2003; Clayton 
2003). What people say about music, the uses to which they put it in their ordinary lives, 
and their music-making practices are all receiving interest from researchers and scholars, 
alongside questions about the structures and processes of the music industry and 
broadcasting corporations and perhaps to a lesser extent, of education. Musicology has 
come under attack from such quarters during the last fifteen years or so, most notably for 
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its alleged formalism and its implicit attribution of autonomous status to Western 
classical music. That is, it has been accused of concentrating on the sounds of music, the 
musical ‘text’, to the detriment of music’s social contexts and uses, and for harbouring an 
assumption that the value and significance of the musical text rise above particular social 
and historical conditions. But we must be careful not to swing too far in the opposite 
direction. To consider the discourse and use surrounding music without taking into 
account the ways in which the musical text is organised, can altogether miss out the 
quality of the very object of consideration, so that in the end it could be food or clothes 
that are under discussion rather than music with its own peculiar properties.  
 
In this article I propose a theory of musical meaning and experience which takes into 
consideration the dialectical relationship between musical text and context, and which is 
flexible enough to apply to a range of musical styles. Through this theory I examine the 
roles played by the school music classroom which, despite the multiplicity of musical 
styles now incorporated into schooling, continues to contribute to the reproduction of 
existing social relations in the wider society. I consider how music itself can be 
understood to construct and communicate apparent ‘truths’ about ourselves and society 
and what role the classroom plays in perpetuating those ‘truths’. Finally I argue for a 
partial but necessary reinstatement of the much-maligned notion of musical autonomy as 
a critical moment in any attempt to change things. 
 
Musical meaning and experience 
What causes us to recognise a particular concatenation of sounds as being music? If we 
hear the sounds of a lorry backing into a side-street, or a steel-pan being tuned, we don’t 
consider them to be music. In order to do so, the listener has to be immersed in a complex 
range of social conventions, which are discernible in relation both to the organisation of 
the sounds themselves, and to the social contexts surrounding their production and 
reception. 
 
Sound is the raw material from which music is made. For music to come into existence 
and for musical experience to occur, this raw material must be organised in such a way as 
to have relationships which are perceived in the mind of a listener. For example, the 
listener might notice features such as patterning, opening and close, whole and part, 
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beginning and end, repetition, similarity, difference, and so on. These features are 
perceptible in several ways. One is that the flow of musical materials through time is 
organised in such a way as to cause listeners to anticipate future sonic events, as L. B. 
Meyer (1956) so persuasively demonstrated with reference to Western classical music, 
and which can equally be referred to many other classical, popular and traditional musics. 
We wait for the final chord or the next note after the pause, we expect the music to break 
out into a melody at the next strong beat, we hear the string flourish or the drummer’s 
extended up-beat as an announcement of the reprise, and so on. Not only does music raise 
expectations for what might be going to happen next, it also causes us to make 
retrospective connections between present and past events, so that the present makes the 
past meaningful; and the musical past colours the present just as much as the present 
raises expectations for the future. In many musics, perhaps even most, expectation and 
retrospection seem to play a relatively small part in the experience. On one hand, 
experienced is focussed on the quality of the sounds: texture, timbre, a crack in the voice, 
a pitch inflection so slight as to be barely noticeable; on the other hand, experience takes 
in a wide field of processual flow, such as the feeling of being carried along on a 
relentless beat. But of course that quality, or that sense of travelling along, nonetheless 
only comes into existence in relation to what went before and what comes afterwards at 
any particular moment.  
 
The mental acts involved in processing music backwards and forwards in time, and 
attending to the quality of the moment or processual flow, involve the making of 
meaningful connections between parts of the music being heard. But these connections 
are not restricted to the particular piece of music in question, for they arise from the 
listener’s previous experience of a number of pieces of music that together make up a 
style, sub-style or genre. Thus the connections can cut across from one piece of music to 
another. I am not referring here to a postmodern concept of intertextuality; indeed what is 
meant by intertextuality has been going on between pieces of music, by necessity, since 
the first music emerged into history. For no music can exist, that is, no music can be 
perceived as music, without reference to a higher-order organising factor, or what can be 
termed a style; and virtually all music has always ‘borrowed’, imitated or directly 
implanted components from other pieces. Perception of the connections within and across 
pieces of music is learnt, acquired through repeated listening and therefore, through some 
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level of familiarity with the style of the music in question. If the listener does not have 
familiarity, relatively few meanings will be conceived. Therefore a piece of music which 
is highly meaningful or very rewarding to one individual, might be relatively meaningless 
or lacking in interest to another. Any one piece of music can give rise to a multiplicity of 
possible meanings. 
 
I refer to the meaningful connections that are forged within and across musical pieces, as 
‘inherent musical meanings’ (Green, 1988; 1997). The word ‘inherent’ has at least two 
meanings in the English language. It can mean that a property of an object is essential, 
ahistorical or natural, which is quite the opposite of how I am using the term. It can also 
mean that a property of an object is contained within the object, but without any 
suggestion of this containment being essential, ahistorical or natural. This is how I am 
using the term. ‘Inherent musical meanings’ are ‘inherent’, in the sense of being 
contained within the musical object, in relation to the historically-constituted, logical 
properties of the meaning-making processes. These processes involve meaning-making 
constituents, or to put it crudely, ‘signs’ which are made of musical materials (a chord, a 
note, a phrase); and meanings-being-meant corresponding with ‘referents’ (the 
anticipated chord or note, the re-cognised melody) that are also made up of musical 
materials. Both ‘signs’ and ‘referents’ are incorporated, embodied, or they inhere and are 
thus inherent within the raw materials that constitute the music in question. However, 
they are of course entirely socially constituted, and recognition of them, as I have already 
suggested, is dependent on listeners’ acquired familiarity with the stylistic norms of the 
music in question. To return to the example of the lorry backing into a side-street or a 
steel-pan being tuned: such sounds could only become music and therefore only carry 
musical meaning by virtue of a complex set of social conventions. The organisation of 
the materials into meaningful relationships, or what I call inherent musical meanings, is 
one such convention. 
 
Someone could object to my claim that musical experience relies on the listener making 
connections between the past, present and future of the musical materials, as follows: that 
if we turn on the radio and hear only the shortest snatch of sound, less than a second, we 
can still tell it is music that we are hearing, rather than, say, a spoken voice, a lorry 
turning or some other sound. We can tell this even though we are quite unable to make 
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any connections between the snatch of sound that we heard and any ones that preceded it 
or followed after it. How then can we recognise the sound as music, if it is the case that 
such recognition requires a perception of inherent meanings arising from making 
connections between parts of the music as they pass in time, as suggested above? One 
response is to say that we do not actually have a musical experience in that situation. 
Rather we recognise that the snatch of sound comes from one or more musical 
instruments or sung voices, and we assume that because it was heard on the radio, putting 
two and two together, it must be part of a piece of music.  
 
This is so, but there is in fact something else going on which is of much deeper 
significance. For our assumption that the snatch of sound comes from a piece of music 
derives from a quite different aspect of musical meaning, an aspect that relates not to the 
interrelationships of musical materials, that is not to musical inherent meanings; but to 
music’s social context and its mediation as a cultural object through historical social 
institutions. In other words, it derives from musical meanings which point outwards from 
the musical text towards concepts, relationships or things that exist independently of it. I 
refer to such meanings as ‘delineations’, (Green, 1988; 1997) in other words, as meanings 
which are loosely suggested or metaphorically sketched by the music in relation to its 
social context. Factors such as the clothes and hairstyles of the musicians, their listeners 
or fans; the venues in which the music is relayed; the social or political values associated 
with the music, which may or may not be embodied in lyrics; the musical practices of the 
listeners, and indeed other social practices connected with them, and so on, all come into 
play.  
 
Any particular piece of music may mean something we can relate to, something we 
dislike, something we desire and so on. Individuals will have a multiplicity of responses 
to musical delineations, some of which are shared and generally agreed upon by the 
majority of people in any particular society or social group; others of which will be 
entirely idiosyncratic. For example a National Anthem delineates the nation, monarchy, 
president or whatever is relevant to practically everyone in and beyond a particular 
nation; but to some individuals it can delineate pride whereas to others it delineates 
shame; to some love, to others hatred. Not only are there obvious examples such as 
National Anthems, wedding songs, football songs which acquire generally-recognised 
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conventional meanings, but there are far more subtle levels of delineation, such as the 
sound of a particular flute, the way an electric guitar is distorted, a rhythm, a vocal 
inflection, the precise bend of a pitch; all of which can carry delineated meanings which 
are conventionally recognised to a greater or lesser extent. A piece of music may also 
delineate a particular event or feeling that arose on one occasion for one particular 
individual when she was listening to it, that has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
meanings conventionally attributed to it by the rest of her society. 
 
Some sociologists of music have argued that it is not possible to fully appreciate a 
particular piece of music unless one is an insider to, or at least unless one has some 
insider-knowledge of the culture in which the music was originally produced. Detractors 
from this position have pointed to the capacity of music to carry across times and places, 
allowing people from one culture to respond with enjoyment to music from other very 
different cultures (see the debate between Vulliamy and Shepherd, 1984, 1985 and 
Swanwick, 1984). Notwithstanding fundamental disagreements, both sides would tend to 
agree that one can have a fuller, richer understanding if one is an insider; and that if not, 
the acquisition of some knowledge about the social context in which the music was 
originally produced is likely to enhance the listening experience. But it is not only the 
context of production, for unavoidably, the context of reception also contributes to the 
music’s delineations. No music can ever be heard (that is, heard-as-music) outside of a 
social context. Taking music out of its original context of production and putting it into 
even a completely new and different context of reception does not cause it to lose 
delineated meanings; it merely replaces some delineations (related to the context of 
production) with others (related to the context of reception). We can still have a musical 
experience even if we know absolutely nothing about the original social contexts, so long 
as we can recognise the piece as being a piece of music in the first place.  
 
For that recognition to take place we must rely on the perception of inherent meanings. 
But I have suggested that unless the listener has some familiarity with the style, then no 
experience of inherent meanings will occur. So to return to the example of the snatch of 
music on the radio: it is precisely the radio, the social conventions surrounding radio 
broadcasting, or other circumstances such as the concert platform, the gathering of 
dancers in the centre of the village and so on, in combination with the musical inherent 
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meanings, that tell us it is music we are hearing. In short, recognition of the social, 
collective definitions of what counts as music is a necessary component of what makes 
something music. No music can exist at all without its transmitting some delineation or 
other. Musical delineation is not merely an add-on to inherent musical meaning. On the 
contrary, it goes on at a fundamental level from the very first moment of recognition of 
sounds as being music at all. Delineation is therefore as fundamental to musical meaning 
as inherent meaning and indeed, without experience of musical delineation, no musical 
experience could come about at all. For without some understanding of the fact that 
music is a social construction, we would ultimately be unable to recognise any particular 
collection of sounds as music. So, when we listen to music, we cannot separate our 
experience of its inherent meanings entirely from an awareness of the social context that 
accompanies its production and/or reception. 
 
Past commentators have occasionally misunderstood or objected to this understanding of 
musical meaning, because, they say, the difference between the two aspects of meaning is 
not clear-cut. I wish to respond to that in two ways, firstly by disagreeing with it, then by 
agreeing with it. The distinction is clear-cut in a logical sense, in terms of the processes 
by which the meaning is made. As I suggested earlier, with inherent meaning the ‘signs’ 
and the ‘referents’ all consist of musical materials. A sound refers to another sound either 
in the same piece of music or beyond it in another piece, or within the style in general 
terms. With delineated meaning, the ‘sign’ is made up of musical materials, that is, 
sounds, but the ‘referent’ is made up of non-musical constituents related to the social 
context of the music’s production and reception. In short, with inherent meaning the 
process of signification occurs from sound to sound, whereas with delineation it occurs 
from sound to non-sound. That encapsulates the logical distinction between the two types 
of meaning.  
 
Secondly, however, I agree that in other ways the two meanings are not distinguishable, 
and indeed it is precisely the difficulty of distinguishing between them that interests me 
most. The point of making the distinction is to contribute to a theoretical understanding 
of musical experience; but we do not tend to distinguish between the two types of 
meaning, or to separate them out experientially when engaging in music. This presents no 
problem for the theory to my mind, quite the opposite in fact, for it is quite normal as 
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well as helpful to make theoretical distinctions between things that we find hard to 
distinguish experientially. Take the example of love. We can theoretically distinguish 
between different types of love: sexual love, parental love, filial love, love between 
siblings, love between friends, and so on. We can also make distinctions between other 
cognate areas, for example liking, desire, lust. But experientially it is not always easy to 
separate these feelings out from each other, and indeed that difficulty leads to a great deal 
of confusion and complexity in our lives. But that does not mean we give up the idea of 
making the distinctions theoretically, for there are so many cases where they are clear and 
helpful. The fact that other areas exist where they are confused, only serves to remind us 
of the complexity of human culture, and that theory is a mere tool to help us achieve a 
better understanding of that complexity, rather than undermining theory per se, or 
refuting a particular theory. So it is with the dialectical theory of musical meaning which 
I am putting forward here.  
 
Although as I have argued, our prior experiences and our social circumstances will 
greatly affect our responses to music, they cannot be said to be wholly determining 
factors. For even though music relies on social convention for its existence, this does not 
mean that it has no objective properties which would carry across different social 
contexts, or which lend themselves more-or-less forcefully to particular types of response 
or meaningful experience. To that extent music can be said to have objective properties 
existing independently of convention. Music is not merely a symptom of our musical 
practices and meanings, but it acts back on us, through its capacity to influence our 
beliefs, values, feelings or behaviour; or as Moore (2002), De Nora (2000) and E. Clarke 
(2003) put it, adapting the concept from Gibson (1986, pp. 127-43), it affords different 
responses. As a simple example: if an adult in any country that I can think of, asks young 
children to dance to some fast, loud music with an explicit beat, the children are likely to 
jump around vigorously; if she asks them to dance to some soft, slow music, they will 
glide about gracefully. To what extent have the children learnt these responses from 
conventional usage of music in the particular social context to which they are 
accustomed; and to what extent are these responses natural and universal? It would be 
hasty to altogether throw out the idea that the responses retain some natural or universal 
elements. An example of the different types of funeral music or music used in death-rites 
that can be found in different cultures is often used to point to the social constructedness 
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of musical meanings: that in some societies such music is slow whereas in others it is 
fast. But this does not mean that the same characteristics of music (fast or slow) afford 
different responses in different social contexts; rather it means that the responses to death 
and bereavement are different, or are expressed differently.  
 
The dialectics of musical meaning and experience 
The theory which I am putting forward posits a dialectical relationship between the two 
types of musical meaning identified. Musical experience, in this model, cannot occur at 
all unless both aspects of meaning are in operation to some extent or other. However, this 
is not to imply that both types of meaning always co-exist to the same degree, or that we 
are always conscious of both, or even either, of them. Indeed, our responses to each 
aspect of musical meaning can be in contradiction, each aspect can have a different effect 
upon musical experience as a whole, and more interestingly, each can influence and 
overpower the other.  
 
In order to think through these claims, it is helpful to understand our responses to each 
aspect of musical meaning in terms of polar extremes, although in practice of course 
individuals will experience a variety of subtle shades at different points along each pole. 
Chart A is intended to provide some graphic aid to thinking through these matters. With 
regards to inherent meaning, we can have a highly affirmative, or positive response. This 
will occur when we are very familiar with the style or the particular piece, we understand 
its nuances, and we are carried along securely or pleasurably in its ebb and flow. The 
greater our familiarity with the style of the music, the more affirmative the experience is 
likely to be. For when we are familiar with the normative stylistic terms of reference in a 
piece of music, we are able to distinguish disruption from normality and resolution from 
disruption. If the music surprises us with, say, an unexpected event, we understand it. 
Although our expectations may have been negated, we assimilate the negation in terms of 
a wider field of presence related to other parts of the music and to the style, and thus we 
enjoy it: without negation, disruption, difference and so on, at whatever level, no inherent 
musical meaning could arise. Only through these and through our understanding of them 
do we relate meaningfully to music. Hence ultimately, our negation is understood in the 
light of its own affirmation: we are negated only because we understand, to whatever 
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extent, the style of the music; and we are thus affirmed in our overall musical experience 
as it takes place in time.   
 
PLEASE INSERT CHART A ABOUT HERE 
 
At the other extreme, there is a negative response. This is likely to occur when we are 
unfamiliar with the musical style, for we are then less likely to understand the music, and 
may have difficulty making sense of it or responding to its internal similarities and 
continuities, differences and changes. An event which would surprise and delight a 
listener who has greater familiarity, will go completely unnoticed, so the music seems 
uneventful and dull. In such circumstances, the capacity of a piece of music to engage our 
interest is relatively limited. Not being aware of what is and is not normative, we cannot 
readily distinguish disruption or its resolution, are unable to hear constituent parts as 
things in themselves, and cannot relate them to other constituents within the piece or 
across pieces. We therefore receive few, or merely confused, inherent meanings; we 
cannot engage with the music, are rarely negated and rarely affirmed. Such an experience 
can be boring, but it can also be more forceful and quite painfully aggravating or 
irritating. When musical style is this unfamiliar, we may well find the music random or 
incoherent. Our experience is fragmented, tossed to and fro on apparently unrelenting, 
arbitrary waves of meaningless movement.  
 
Such an experience can be illustrated by an anecdote of a music student in a class on the 
twentieth-century atonal composer Schoenberg. On listening to the vocal and 
instrumental piece ‘Mondestruncken’ from his Pierrot Lunaire, she declared she found 
the music incoherent, chaotic and random, and that listening to it was like a form of slow 
torture. Unfamiliarity with Schoenberg’s compositional procedures and the style of the 
music in general, had prevented her noticing a high level of organisation of the musical 
materials, for example a distinctive seven-note motif which is uninterruptedly repeated 
four times in the flute at the beginning, repeated again and taken up in varied forms by 
other instruments throughout the rest of the piece. As a result of her unfamiliarity with 
such stylistic factors, amongst others, she received few meanings from the music, which 
is one reason why she had such a negative response to it.   
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We are uplifted, affirmed, bored or aggravated by music's inherent meanings in as many 
different ways as the diversity of musical style and of our individual understanding and 
prior experiences imply. Similarly, we can have a range of responses from positive to 
negative in relation to delineated meaning.  
 
At one extreme we have a positive response when we feel the music in some way 
expresses our feelings, when we identify with the music because it delineates our social 
class or supports our political values, when it affirms our preferred clothing, hair-style, 
our age, ethnicity, gender and many other factors. At the other extreme we can have a 
negative response when we feel the music delineates social or political values of which 
we disapprove or from which we want to disassociate ourselves, social groups from 
which we are excluded, and so on. To illustrate such responses here are two snippets 
from Bennett’s ethnographic work with Asian youth and their relationship with Bhangra 
music in Newcastle, UK in the late 1990s. Some used it to celebrate ‘tradition’, and 
valued it as a family music crossing generations; others rejected it as a way of articulating 
their separateness from these same traditions and family values. For example:  
It’s good to go to a bhangra event because…it brings back memories…it’s like 
tradition. It’s the same with the dancing like. There is a traditional 
dance…nowadays some people just move how they want to. But I think it [the 
traditional bhangra dance] does matter in some ways, ‘cause it gives you a buzz to 
be doing something a bit traditional. (Bennett, 2000, p. 111) 
Alternatively: 
I was brought up listening to bhangra, because that’s what my parents listened 
to…there was nothing else to listen to really. Then, as soon as I got to about 
thirteen or fourteen…I had different friends, white friends, and a different kind of 
atmosphere. I started listening to their tapes and I’d find out what I really liked 
which is dance music…Now I can’t stand bhangra. (p. 117) 
 
What is meant by ‘I can’t stand bhangra’? Is it that the person is aggravated by the 
inherent meanings of the music, or negated by the delineated social values the music 
carries? It would not be unreasonable to assume that our responses to inherent and 
delineated meanings usually correspond. If we dislike the one we are likely to dislike the 
other. For example, if we are already negative to music’s delineations, we are unlikely to 
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be affirmed by its inherent meanings; and indeed, unlikely to get ourselves in a position 
to become sufficiently familiar with its inherent meanings for affirmation to take place. If 
school children are perfectly sure that Western classical music is intended only for 
‘boffins’ and very boring adults (delineations), they are likely to dismiss its inherent 
meanings as being equally boring. They will therefore avoid listening to it and for that 
reason will continue to be unfamiliar with its inherent meanings; and for that reason in 
turn are highly unlikely to suddenly get a kick out of listening to the Scherzo of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Conversely, if our responses to inherent meanings are 
already negative, it is likely we will dismiss the delineations too. Some classical 
musicians today still believe that popular music is wholly simplistic and very easy to 
play. The pop-musicological challenge to that perception includes the point that such 
listeners seek the ‘wrong’ qualities in the music, expecting to hear motivic development 
for example; and in so doing, miss out on hearing the ‘right’ qualities, such as timbral 
change, rhythmic inflection or texture (Middleton, 1990; Brackett, 1995). The 
Schoenberg student is another example, because not only did she find the inherent 
meanings tortuous, she dismissed the whole enterprise of modernist abstract art and 
atonal music as pretentious. 
 
What I term ‘celebration’ is experienced when a positive experience of inherent meanings 
is accompanied by positive inclinations towards delineations. Contrastingly, ‘alienation’ 
is experienced when a negative experience of inherent meanings is accompanied by 
negativity towards delineations.  
 
But sometimes the two aspects of musical meaning are in contradiction, and this will 
engender an experience of ‘ambiguity’. There are two ideal types of ambiguity. In one of 
these, the experience of inherent meaning is negative, whilst that of delineated meaning is 
positive. For example, we can think of a person who dislikes Mozart’s music and hears it 
as boring, frilly and superficial. As a result he hardly ever listens to it, which means in 
turn that his familiarity with the style is quite low. All in all such factors are liable to 
make him negative towards the inherent meanings. But at the same time, he can 
nonetheless approve of and identify with the delineations: the practice of taking important 
overseas business colleagues to the opera, perhaps (he would never consider taking them 
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to a rock gig!); the social-class values with which the music is associated in his mind, and 
so on. He is thus positive towards the music’s delineations.  
 
Alternatively, experience of inherent meaning can be positive whilst that of delineated 
meaning is negative. In such a case we can think of the classical music-lover who is 
totally familiar with the inherent meanings of Wagner’s music, say; who has perhaps 
listened to, played or sung his music for many years, and has thus developed a profound 
knowledge of the style, allowing her to be thoroughly affirmed by the inherent meanings. 
But, simultaneously, she has strong antipathies to Wagner because of his renowned anti-
semitism and the harnessing of his music by Nazi Germany; or perhaps she simply 
dislikes going to the opera because she thinks the rest of the audience are ‘stuffy’; or she 
is critical of most operatic plots because she finds them sexist, racist, and so on.  
 
Not only may the quality of the response to each type of meaning contradict the other, but 
something else can occur which is perhaps one of the most provocative aspects of music, 
and raises some interesting issues for music education. This is that the response to one 
aspect of meaning can overpower, influence and even change the other.  
 
On one hand, delineation can override inherent meaning. For example, a late nineteenth-
century Scandinavian music critic was in the habit of writing very positive reviews about 
a particular composer. After many reviews, he found out that the composer was a woman. 
He carried on writing good reviews, but his language changed. Instead of using words 
like ‘strident’, ‘virile’ or ‘powerful’, he began to use words like ‘delicate’ and ‘sensitive’. 
What had happened was that the gender of the composer had entered the delineations of 
the music for this listener, as a problematic aspect that challenged contemporary 
assumptions about gender, musical practice and compositional creativity. This new 
delineation then affected the way that the critic heard the inherent meanings (Green, 
1997).  
 
On the other hand, the notion that inherent meaning can act back to change our 
perception of delineation appears at first to be a logical impossibility. For inherent 
meaning is devoid of content; it exists as a virtual aspect of musical experience, which 
can itself only occur if there is also a delineated content. However I will argue at the end 
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of this article that experience of inherent meaning can indeed change, and challenge, our 
musical responses to and presuppositions concerning delineation; and that it is in this 
moment of musical autonomy, that the most critical power of music resides.  
 
Musical experience and social reproduction 
Music education in schools for most of the twentieth century took it for granted that the 
musical experience and needs of all children were fundamentally the same. All students 
were required to engage in music whose inherent meanings ranged from being 
affirmatory for some of them, to being wholly alienating for others; and whose 
delineations corresponded or conflicted with the students’ social class and family 
backgrounds, self-images, public or private identities, values and desires. Music 
education is intended to enhance and appraise students’ musical abilities, but at the same 
time there may be something else altogether going on. This proposition can be considered 
on two levels, one reflecting the experience of the individual student, in all the diversity 
that implies; and the other concerning the production and reproduction of large-scale 
social groups and corresponding patterns of advantage and opportunity, to which the 
education system makes such a powerful contribution. I will briefly consider these two 
levels and in so doing, illustrate the role of the music classroom in the production and 
reproduction of two social groups in particular, class and gender.  
 
There is little disagreement nowadays that in its concentration on Western classical music 
for at least the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, music education participated 
in the construction and perpetuation of certain ideologies about musical value that 
privileged this musical style. These ideologies involved placing a high value on qualities 
said to be possessed by classical music, notably those of its autonomy from particular 
social interests and contexts; its corresponding ability to express a ‘universal’ human 
condition; its eternality, which was also related to its universality; and its formal 
complexity, (which was paradoxically related to the social convention of notation, on 
which it relies for its transmission). The school classroom afforded greater opportunities 
for educational success in music to those children from social class backgrounds that 
equipped them with commensurate practices and values regarding classical music. This 
occurred partly with regards to access to resources such as musical instruments and 
private tuition. Indeed, the assumption that such access was a pre-requisite of musical 
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success was even written into exam syllabi, explicitly in the 1950s, then implicitly, right 
up to the middle of the 1980s (Green, 1988).  
 
This was by no means only a question of access, for pupils’ relationships to musical 
meaning are a more trenchant factor. Affirmation by the inherent meanings of the music 
being studied is as advantageous as affinity with the music’s delineations, allowing for 
possible ‘celebration’ by the music in the classroom. These positive responses to both 
inherent and delineated meanings, of course derive largely from students’ having family 
and social class backgrounds in which classical music is listened to and valued, so that 
they are already well equipped in Bourdieu’s terms, with what the school demands but 
does not provide (Bourdieu, 1973: 80). Many of those pupils who did not have such 
backgrounds appeared to lack both interest and ability in music, concealing the fact that a 
small but significant minority of them were deeply involved in other musical styles 
related to quite different learning practices outside the school, such as playing in pop, 
rock or jazz bands (Green, 2001). But it was not only the musical practices in which 
pupils were or were not engaged that caused this fissure in the institutional recognition 
and reward of musical ability. For musical experience itself, in which pupils found 
themselves being celebrated or alienated, or through which they had ambiguous musical 
experiences, is more fundamental. I will return to the significance of this at the end of the 
article.  
 
Another factor in the music classroom’s production and reproduction of social groups 
concerns the invisibility of the reproduction processes. These were perhaps buried even 
more deeply, and ironically so, by virtue of an appearance of increased equality of 
opportunity which started to occur in the late 1980s, when a wider range of music was 
included in the school curriculum in many countries (Green, 2002). For since popular, 
jazz and ‘world’ musics were, at last, accepted in the classroom, this appeared to afford 
greater opportunities to pupils from a much wider range of social groups than hitherto. 
But there were two problems here. One was that teachers still tended to operate within an 
aesthetic of classical musical autonomy, only they referred this aesthetic to a wider range 
of musics. So popular musics, jazz and ‘world’ musics were assumed to have some 
amount of autonomy, universality, eternality and the capacity to express the human 
condition, especially in their ability to cross cultural boundaries. Such a position therefore 
Journal of Educational Philosophy and Theory 16 
appeared to place equal value on a wider range of musics, whilst actually continuing to 
uphold an aesthetic position that was fundamentally derived from classical paradigms, 
and was not necessarily applicable to most of these ‘other’ musics in the world outside 
the school (Green, 1999). The other problem was, and continues to be, that teachers tend 
to be largely trained in classical music themselves, and to adopt twentieth century-
derived classical pedagogical approaches, which ride roughshod over the informal 
learning practices by which most of these other musics have always been transmitted. 
Thus, although there is new content in the music classroom, the teaching strategies 
mitigate against its authenticity. The musics in that sense exist inside the classroom as 
shadows of their ‘real’ forms (Green 2001). 
 
The majority of pupils who choose to sing and play classical music, or the music 
provided and organised by their teachers in schools, especially in extra-curricular 
activities, are girls. They are also widely regarded by teachers as being more successful at 
music, more tolerant, hard-working and reliable than boys. Meanwhile boys are generally 
said to avoid music because of its ‘cissy’ connotations, restricting their involvement to 
those areas of musical activity that signal the least approval, and the least supervision, by 
teachers (Green, 1997; Hanley, 1998). However, as distinct from the hard-working 
obedience of girls, it is not despite but because of boys’ negative attitudes, that teachers 
attribute boys with the qualities of creativity and genius which girls are seen to lack 
(Green, 1997). 
 
Again this involvement of music in reproducing age-old gender assumptions does not 
stop merely at the level of pupils’ musical practice and teachers’ perceptions of it. It goes 
further, in that the music involved takes on corresponding delineated meanings. As the 
discourse of both pupils and teachers shows, to a large extent classroom-approved music 
comes to delineate femininity, and more radically, effeminacy. By the same token, 
popular music, or any music that is not included in the curriculum or extra-curricular 
activities, and not taught by the teacher, delineates masculinity, and beyond that, 
machismo. It is not merely a matter of ‘feminine’ practice that girls play the violin, or of 
‘masculine’ practice that boys play the electric guitar; but musical experience itself, and 
with it, the very construction of gender as a symbol of self, are at stake. The music in 
which girls and boys are involved acts back through these gendered delineations, to bring 
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a symbolic affirmation, or a problematisation of their gender identity. So as with social 
class reproduction, musical experience itself, in the context of the school, actually 
produces and reproduces not only gendered musical practices but gender identities and 
with them, gender itself.  
 
By similar processes other social groups are produced and reproduced in the music 
classroom. For example, many schools incorporate ‘world music’ to reflect and celebrate 
the ethnicity of their pupils. But, as Bennett’s work illustrates (above), this can backfire. 
Alden (1998) found that primary school children in London concealed their ‘true’ Hindi 
popular music identity and pretended to prefer the pop charts, to avoid being stigmatised 
by the ‘white’, mainstream culture, which prevailed in their classroom, despite the 
school’s anti-racist policies and multi-cultural curricula. Other social groups, from large-
scale religions to small-scale local scenes, can be similarly affirmed or denied by the 
music classroom, forming themselves not only through its purview, but precisely, in 
contradistinction to the music and musical experiences that the classroom offers.  
 
In classrooms, some pupils will find themselves musically celebrated by positive 
relationships to both inherent and delineated meanings; others will be alienated, and for 
others, musical experience will be ambiguous. The reasons are not to do with innate 
musical ability, but are the result of family and social class background, membership of 
different social groups, and prior listening experiences. But I have been suggesting that it 
is not merely that the music classroom makes available, rewards or negates musical 
experiences; something else is going on which is more interesting and more powerful. 
Since music itself carries meanings for us, therefore reproduction occurs through musical 
experience itself. As I argued earlier, the distinction between the two aspects of musical 
meaning that I have suggested in this article is a logical one, but when we engage with 
music the two aspects come to us experientially as one unified whole. We do not usually, 
and often cannot, distinguish the one from the other, just as we find it hard sometimes to 
distinguish different kinds of love from each other. Because of this, the delineated 
meanings of music appear to come to us as if they were a part of the inherent meanings, 
the ‘music itself’. So our responses to inherent meanings appear to be visceral; the 
inherent meanings appear to contain the delineated meanings as if those meanings did 
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reside inside the music. Thus they seem to be immediate, that is, un-mediated by history 
and convention, not constructed, but natural, unquestionable and ‘true’.  
 
Retrieving autonomy 
If music is such a conservative force, and music education along with it, do either of them 
also have the capacity to change things? This is where I wish to reach for that discarded 
concept of musical autonomy. Where the concept becomes problematic is when it goes so 
far as to completely deny the importance and relevance of music’s social contexts or 
delineations, focussing instead on the musical text or inherent meanings in ways that 
either explicitly or implicitly suggest that these are the only ‘real’ or ‘important’ aspects 
of music. Such an approach does indeed beg for adjustment so that social and cultural 
influences on both the production and reception of that text are included in any 
examination of its full significance. However there are three provisos to this.  
 
One is that there can surely be nothing ‘wrong’ with musicologists focussing entirely on 
musical texts and ignoring social contexts, so long as it is done in the recognition that 
they are only concerning themselves with some, out of many possible, aspects of the 
music (Green, 2000). Secondly, historical musicology has in any case always concerned 
itself with the social contexts in which the music studied was originally produced, and 
with the music’s reception at the time of origin and beyond. It may be that such work did 
not concern itself with certain aspects of those contexts, such as the roles of women in 
music; but that is a different matter. Thirdly, it is only because music does indeed retain 
some level of autonomy from social contexts that it can exist at all. Music cannot be 
whatever people say it is. Any attempt to suggest that it can be, and thus to altogether 
deny its autonomy, ironically ends up as a position of idealism (which is the very 
accusation levelled at the autonomists, but for different reasons!). For it presupposes that 
music has no objective properties, that its materials are immaterial, so to speak, as if 
music could be made out of any material whatsoever, organised in any way, and still be 
counted as music. It is partly because we cannot see or touch music, that it is often 
regarded in such a light; but music is of course an object like any other object in the 
world, fleeting perhaps, but nonetheless material. And as I suggested earlier, in relation to 
Gibson’s terminology, certain music affords certain responses rather than others.  
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Not only is it unwise in a logical sense to totally dismiss the concept of autonomy, but it 
might also lead to overlooking one of the most critical capacities made available by 
music. (This notion is more fully developed in Green, 1997: 249-56. D. Clarke, 2003 
suggests a similar perspective.) For example, imagine a social and historical context in 
which it is generally assumed that a class of teenaged school pupils will not be capable of 
singing with conviction in an opera, since they are exclusively and jealously interested in 
pop music; or a context in which it is assumed that women cannot play orchestral 
instruments confidently, since they are too feeble; or one in which it is assumed that 
women cannot compose music that is ‘strident’, ‘virile’ or ‘powerful’; or that white 
people cannot sing the blues authentically … Then imagine a situation where you see and 
hear these very things going on, and where the inherent meanings of the music hit you, 
not as being somehow lacking, feeble or inauthentic, but the opposite: as musical 
affirmation.  
 
Such moments, arising from a virtual experience of inherent meanings logically set free 
from delineations, can explode the apparent ‘truth’ of the old, taken-for-granted 
delineations. We touch a quality of musical experience which, precisely because of its 
logical freedom from delineation, at the same time exposes the inevitability of 
delineation. The previous assumptions about teenaged school children, women, race or 
whatever surface. The delineations about them are made audible. Then a host of new 
delineations, new conceptions, both of music and of teenagers, women, race and so on 
become possible. It is through such experiences of inherent meanings as logically 
separable from delineation, and thereby as potentially open to any content, that new 
musical and social horizons can appear. 
 
So in that sense I would say that music can cross boundaries, and has done so many times 
in its long history. This is one reason why music education continues to be worthwhile: 
for although education has reproductive effects such as those I have considered earlier, it 
also offers us the potential to challenge our understanding and awareness at a deep, 
symbolic level, through bringing together new and previously disparate meanings and 
experiences. Of most particular significance here is that such moments may be most 
forceful when we engage with music not only as listeners but as music-makers. In 
making music, students have a direct effect upon inherent meanings, indeed bring them 
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into being, and are thus able to imbue the music with a delineated content of their own. 
The potential freedom, or autonomy of such content from previously taken-for-granted 
assumptions and definitions is thus potentially exposed. It is precisely by acknowledging 
music’s logical moment of autonomy from social contexts, that we reveal how readily 
music becomes filled with social content and significance. At the same time therefore, 
this perspective carries a caution: against making any assumptions about how music is 
understood by others.  
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(Adapted from Green, 1988: 138 and 1997: 251) 
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